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THIRD TIME’S THE CHARM: WILL BASEL III
HAVE A MEASURABLE IMPACT ON LIMITING
FUTURE FINANCIAL TURMOIL?
Erin Pentz*
INTRODUCTION
Although international economies have faced financial
turmoil many times over the last century, the 2008 financial crisis
brought catastrophic bank failures not seen since the Great
Depression.1 Regulatory agencies responded swiftly to identify the
source of the developing crisis and establish new rules to reduce
vulnerability in the banking sector and prevent future crises.2 With
the endorsement of the G-20 Leaders,3 the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision established the Basel III capital requirements to
be implemented by all member nations4 by January 1, 2018.5

* J.D. Candidate, 2014, Dickinson School of Law, Pennsylvania State
University.
1 See Marilyn Geewax, Did the Great Recession Bring Back the 1930s?, NAT’L
PUB.
RADIO
(July
11,
2012,
11:52
AM),
http://www.npr.org/2012/07/11/155991507/did-the-great-recession-bring-backthe-1930s.
2 Stefan Walter, Secretary General, Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision at the 5th Biennial Conference on Risk Management and Supervision:
Basel
III
and
Financial
Stability
(Nov.
3,
2010),
http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp101109a.htm.
3 Press Release, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Results of the
Dec. 2010 Meeting (Dec. 1, 2010), http://www.bis.org/press/p101201a.htm.
4 Member nations include: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada,
China, France, Germany, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea,
Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South
Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United
States. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS,
BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS
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This comment will consider the feasibility of international
banking regulations under Basel III as applied to varying economies.
Part I will address the rise of “Too Big to Fail” financial institutions
and their effect on international economies, which sparked the desire
for uniform international banking standards.6 Part II will summarize
historic international banking regulations and the failures of those
measures that have set the groundwork for development of Basel
III.7
Part III will discuss the post-recession stability of varying
economies, the level of pre-recession banking regulation in each of
those economies, and the path each is taking to implement the Basel
III standards.8 In Part IV, this comment will evaluate whether Basel
III’s uniform application of banking regulation across highly differing
economies is feasible or productive.9
This comment concludes that Basel III is unlikely to have a
major impact on the ability of financial sectors to weather economic
storms. As a baseline measure, Basel III may hinder increased efforts
for stability because its minimums are set with an eye towards
concerns of competitiveness in the international marketplace.
Historical practices show that changes to minimum capital
requirements may be useless without strong financial regulation and
diverse banking sectors.
I. “TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL”
The Secretary General of the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, Stefan Walter summarized the general causes of banking
crises as “excess leverage, too little capital of insufficient quality, and

AND BANKING SYSTEMS

1 n.1 (Dec. 2010) (rev. June 2011), [hereinafter BASEL III],
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf.
5 BASEL III, supra note 4, at 10.
6 See infra Part I.
7 See infra Part II.
8 See infra Part III.
9 See infra Part IV.
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inadequate liquidity buffers” to weather economic downturns.10 In
the United States, Washington Mutual’s failure in 2008 was record
breaking.11 With assets of $307 billion, but only about $188 billion in
deposits, Washington Mutual simply had insufficient liquidity to
outlast the collapse of the U.S. housing market.12
The U.S. government did nothing to prevent the failure of
Washington Mutual.13 However, in his speech in 2010, Walter
recognized that some troubled banks could not be allowed to fail;
some were simply “too-big-to-fail.”14 Certain financial institutions in
both the U.S. and abroad15 have become so interconnected with the
global financial system that failure could have repercussions that
extend to the entire international banking system.16 Additionally, in
nations with established insurance protocols to protect consumer
deposits—for example, the United States’ Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC)—some financial institutions have become so
large that available insurance funds may not adequately cover
10 Stefan Walter, Secretary General, Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, 5th Biennial Conference on Risk Management and Supervision: Basel
III
and
Financial
Stability
(Nov.
3,
2010),
http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp101109a.htm.
11 Regulator Sells Washington Mutual, BBC NEWS (Sept. 26, 2008),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7637026.stm; Eric Dash & Andrew R.
Sorkin, WaMu is Seized in Largest Bank Failure in U.S. History, STARTRIBUNE, Sept.
25, 2008, http://www.startribune.com/business/29776529.html?refer=y.
12 Regulator Sells Washington Mutual, BBC NEWS (Sept. 26, 2008),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7637026.stm.
13 Eric Dash & Andrew R. Sorkin, WaMu is Seized in Largest Bank Failure
in
U.S.
History,
STARTRIBUNE,
Sept.
25,
2008,
http://www.startribune.com/business/29776529.html?refer=y
(Regulators
brokered an emergency sale of nearly all of the bank’s assets, rather than injecting
substantial sums of taxpayer dollars to prevent collapse).
14 Stefan Walter, Secretary General, Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, 5th Biennial Conference on Risk Management and Supervision: Basel
III
and
Financial
Stability
(Nov.
3,
2010),
http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp101109a.htm.
15 The Financial Services Authority in the United Kingdom chose to
nationalize Bradford & Bingley before it failed due to over-leveraging because
failure may have harmed the banking system as a whole. Treasury to Nationalise B&B
Bank,
BBC
NEWS
(Sept.
28,
2008),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7640143.stm.
16 Dash & Sorkin, supra note 13.
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depositor losses in the event of the institution’s bankruptcy.17 If one
of these large financial institutions failed, agencies like the FDIC
would be forced either to seek additional funds from the government
or to allow consumers to suffer.18
One solution for governments facing the potential failure of a
“Too-Big-to-Fail” institution has been for the government to inject
capital, occasionally in substantial proportions, into the flailing
institutions.19 In 2008, the government revived Citigroup, a U.S.
financial institution with 200 million customers and branches in over
100 countries, by injecting the bank with $45 million in capital.20
First, the U.S. government attempted to recruit Wachovia, another
major financial institution, to help Citigroup reduce risky assets and
acquire low-cost funding.21 When the deal fell through, concerns
about the effect of Citigroup’s potential bankruptcy inspired the U.S.
to infuse millions in taxpayer dollars into the bank.22
In the European Union (E.U.), governments are prohibited
from injecting funds into the private sector.23 However, the extreme
repercussions of the failure of “Too-Big-to-Fail” institutions has led
to certain exceptions, such as the German banking sector’s injection
of $4.8 billion into the failing IKB Deutsche Industriebank.24

Economists predicted that if Washington Mutual had not been seized
and the FDIC was forced to insure consumer’s deposits, the funds available would
not have been adequate. Regulator Sells Washington Mutual, BBC NEWS (Sept. 26,
2008), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7637026.stm.
18 Id.
19 See David Enrich et al., U.S. Agrees to Rescue Struggling Citigroup, WALL
ST. JOURNAL, Nov. 24, 2008,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122747680752551447.html.
20 Id.
21 Tobias Buck, National Reputation Hangs on IKB Rescue, FIN. TIMES, Aug.
2,
2007,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7017b0c0-411a-11dc-8f370000779fd2ac.html - axzz2ABEJZjXP.
22 Enrich, supra note 19.
23 Buck, supra note 21.
24 German banks, public and private, recognized the need to protect IKB
or risk the reputation of the entire industry. They feared a perception of
“insufficient risks standards” at German banks and reduced trust in the German
banking system. Buck, supra note 21.
17
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When possible, governments have facilitated mergers to
avoid bailing out failing institutions using taxpayer dollars.25 When
successful, mergers can help increase funding or decrease liquidity
shortfalls by diversifying capital, as was the hope in the proposed
Citigroup-Wachovia merger.26 In other instances, mergers can simply
allow larger, more stable banks to absorb the assets and liabilities of
failing institutions while increasing their own market share, as was the
case in the United Kingdom based Lloyd’s TSB-Halifax Bank of
Scotland merger.27
One final solution, although utilized less frequently than
other options, is the nationalization of failing banks. In 2007, the
United Kingdom (U.K.) temporarily nationalized Northern Rock
Bank after all other stabilization options seemed ineffective.28
Taxpayers footed the bill to rescue the bank at a cost of nearly £55
billion.29
Although the government injection of capital, the facilitation
of mergers, and the nationalization of private banks prevented the
failure of major financial institutions during the Great Recession of
2007-2009, the problems within the banking industry became the
problems of the entire financial system due to the interconnectivity
of the system.30 These problems have had long-lasting impacts on
national economies.31

25 See Thousands Face Axe in HBOS Merger, BBC NEWS (Sept. 18, 2008),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7622380.stm.
26 Enrich, supra note 19.
27 Thousands Face Axe in HBOS Merger, BBC NEWS (Sept. 18, 2008),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7622380.stm.
28 Northern Rock to be Nationalized, BBC NEWS (Feb. 17, 2008),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7249575.stm.
29 Id.; see also Michael Steen & Peter T. Larsen, Dutch Alter Terms of Fortis
Bail-out, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2008, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f93a9b0891ad-11dd-b5cd-0000779fd18c.html - axzz2H3FnY7f9 (discussing the Dutch
government’s nationalization of banks Fortis and ABN Amro, after attempts to
facilitate mergers failed to save the floundering institutions).
30 See generally Jill Treanor, Toxic Shock: How the Banking Industry Created a
Global
Crisis,
GUARDIAN
(Apr.
7,
2008),
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2008/apr/08/creditcrunch.banking.
31 BASEL III, supra note 4, at 1.
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II. THE BASEL ACCORDS: RESPONSES TO CRISES
A. The Basel Committee’s Purpose
The Basel Committee on Baking Supervision (BCBS) is one
of several committees within the Bank for International Settlements
(BIS).32 The BIS is not a consumer bank, but rather serves central
banks to aid in establishing monetary and financial stability and
international cooperation.33 BCBS was created to develop guidelines
and supervisory standards for financial institutions and is best known
for its development of international standards on capital adequacy.34
The BCBS does not possess any actual legal authority; rather, it
develops best practices and makes recommendations to supervisory
leaders to help implement those initiatives endorsed by member
nations.35
B. Historic Basel
In 1988, the BCBS introduced a framework, known as the
Basel Capital Accord or Basel I,36 designed to manage credit risk in
major financial institutions through the establishment of minimum
capital requirements.37 The initial iteration called for a minimum
capital ratio38 of eight percent.39 Basel I was never intended to be a

32 About
BIS,
BANK
FOR
INT’L
SETTLEMENTS,
http://www.bis.org/about/index.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2013).
33 Established in 1930, BIS is the world’s oldest international financial
institution. Id.
34 About
the Basel Committee, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS,
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/about.htm (last updated Oct. 7, 2012).
35 Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, History of the Basel Committee
and its Membership 1 (2009), http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.pdf.
36 With the introduction of new iterations of the Basel Capital Accord,
this first framework has become known as Basel I. About the Basel Committee, BANK
FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/about.htm (last updated Oct.
7, 2012).
37 Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, supra note 35, at 2.
38 Established by factoring capital to risk-weighted assets (with risk based
on the credit risk of the borrow). Id.
39 Id.
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static, long-term solution.40 Its evolution began in 1991,41 and its first
amendment was published in 1995.42
Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, Basel I’s development
continued with the addition of measures to manage market risk and
improve evaluation of capital adequacy.43 Basel II was released in
2004.44 The new framework focused on three main “pillars”: (1)
minimum capital requirements; (2) supervisory review of an
institution’s capital adequacy and internal assessment process; and (3)
effective use of disclosure to encourage discipline and sound banking
practices.45 Under Basel II, the minimum capital requirement
remained at eight percent.46 However, unlike under Basel I, the BCBS
required half of the total capital under Basel II to consist of Tier 1
capital—the purest and most adequate form of capital (i.e.
shareholder capital).47 Basel II also assigned more stringent risk
weights to certain forms of investments and long-past-due loans.48
Although implementation of Basel II effectively began in
2004,49 the Great Recession began only a few short years later in
2007.50 The causes of the Great Recession are many, but prominent
commentators attributed bank failures to the insufficiency of capital
Id. at 3.
Some critics argue that even early evolution could not save a scheme
that was doomed to fail due to its crudely define risk categories and unfortunate
incentives to increase risk, effectively reducing the capital banks actually held.
Ranjit Lall, From Failure to Failure: The Politics of International Banking Regulation, 19
REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 609, 612 (2012).
42 Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, supra note 35, at 3.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Just as under Basel I. See supra Part I.
47 Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, International Convergence of
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework 12 (2004),
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.pdf.
48 Id. at 27, 33 (assigning a risk weight of 150% to consumers whose
credit is rated lower than a B- and to past due loans with less than 20% equity).
49 See Basel II: Revised International Capital Framework, BANK FOR INT’L
SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2013) (for
a detailed breakdown of the implementation timeline).
50 See supra Introduction.
40
41
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on bank balance sheets coupled with over-leveraging and insufficient
liquidity buffers to weather downturns.51 Thus, the very problems
that BCBS intended to avoid by introducing far-reaching
international banking regulation were the causes of a crisis three years
after Basel II’s implementation began.52 The result was the failure of
443 financial institutions in the U.S. alone.53
C. Basel III
In the wake of the 2008 crisis, the BCBS returned to the
drawing board.54 Intent on “raising the resilience of the banking
sector”, committee members took a five-fold approach to regulation:
(1) raising the quality, consistency, and transparency of the capital
base; (2) enhancing risk coverage; (3) supplementing the risk-based
capital requirement with a leverage ratio; (4) promoting
countercyclical buffers and capital conservation buffers; and (5)
addressing systemic risk and interconnectedness.55 Specifically, Basel
III made adjustments to the minimum capital requirement.56
Although the total capital57 remained at eight percent,58 Tier 1
Capital59 overall was raised to six percent, and Common Equity Tier
1 Capital60 was raised to at least four-and-a-half percent of riskStefan Walter, Secretary General, Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, 5th Biennial Conference on Risk Management and Supervision: Basel
III
and
Financial
Stability
(Nov.
3,
2010),
http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp101109a.htm.
52 Id.
53 Marilyn Geewax, Did the Great Recession Bring Back the 1930s?, NAT’L
PUB. RADIO (July 11, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/07/11/155991507/didthe-great-recession-bring-back-the-1930s.
54 BASEL III, supra note 4, at 2.
55 BASEL III, supra note 4, at 2-5, 7.
56 BASEL III, supra note 4, at 12.
57 Tier 1 Capital plus Tier 2 Capital. BASEL III, supra note 4, at 12.
58 As in Basel I and Basel II. See supra Part II.B.
59 Tier 1 Capital consists of Common Equity Capital, and instruments
issued by the bank that meet the criteria outlined in Basel III, which may include
subordinated instruments or those instruments with nearly negligible credit risk.
BASEL III, supra note 4, at 15-17.
60 Common Equity Tier 1 capital consists of common shares, stock
surplus, retained earnings, and other accumulated income. BASEL III, supra note 4,
at 13.
51
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weighted assets.61 Basel III also established “stress testing”
measures.62
Basel III’s main focus has been the rise of “Too-Big-to-Fail”
institutions.63 The BCBS worked with the Financial Stability Board
(FSB)64 to determine which financial institutions met the status of
“Too-Big-to-Fail”, or termed more specifically, “Systemically
Important Banks”65 (SIBs), upon which Basel III will have the most
significant impact.66 In November of 2011, the FSB released a list of
29 SIBs, including eight U.S. banks, seventeen European banks, three
Japanese banks, and one Chinese bank.67 The BCBS comment
regarding SIBs recognized that some institutions are so large that
individual operating procedures must be conducted with an eye
towards the potential impact on the entire international banking

BASEL III, supra note 4, at 12.
BASEL III, supra note 4, at 46.
63 Agustino Fontevecchia, The 29 Global Banks that are Too Big to Fail,
FORBES
(Nov.
4,
2011),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/afontevecchia/2011/11/04/the-worlds-29-mostsystemically-important-banks/.
64 The FSB was established to enhance cooperation among national and
international supervisory boards and financial institutions. Membership spans the
G20 countries, and the intent is to address vulnerabilities and develop and
implement regulations and policies in the interest of advancing financial stability.
The mandate of the FSB focuses on assessing vulnerabilities, promoting
coordination, monitoring and advising markets and policies, and undertaking joint
actions to plan and develop guidelines. About the FSB: Overview, FIN. STABILITY
BOARD, http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/overview.htm (last visited
Jan. 4, 2013).
65 Defined as: “Financial institutions whose distress or disorderly failure,
because of their size, complexity and systemic interconnectedness, would cause
significant disruption to the wider financial system and economic activity. To avoid
this outcome, authorities have all too frequently had no choice but to forestall the
failure of such institutions through public solvency support.” Fontevecchia, supra
note 63.
66 Press Release, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Dealing with
Domestic Systemically Important Banks: Framework Issued by the Basel
Committee (Oct. 11, 2012), http://www.bis.org/press/p121011.htm.
67 Fontevecchia, supra note 63.
61
62
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system.68 For these 29 banks, BCBS created higher loss absorbency
standards, which range from additional Common Equity Tier 1
Capital of one percent to two-and-a-half percent greater than the
non-SIB standard, depending on the size and systemic importance of
the institution.69 The BCBS also discouraged these institutions from
becoming even more systemically important.70
III. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IN IMPLEMENTATION EFFORTS
A. Canada
The Canadian economy is one of the fifteen largest in the
world (while occasionally breaking into the top ten).71 And yet, not
one of its banks failed during the Great Recession.72 In fact, the
Canadian economy survived the Great Recession relatively
unscathed.73
One of the potential sources of Canadian economic stability
may be the drastic difference between the Canadian banking system

Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Global Systemically Important
Banks: Assessment Methodology and the Additional Loss Absorbency
Requirement: Cover Note (Nov. 2011), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs207cn.pdf.
69 Press Release, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Measures for
Global Systemically Important Banks Agreed by the Group of Governors and
Heads of Supervision (June 25, 2011), http://www.bis.org/press/p110625.htm.
70 Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Global Systemically Important
Banks: Assessment Methodology and the Additional Loss Absorbency
Requirement: Rules Text (Nov. 2011), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs207.pdf.
71 Kevin Carmichael, A Middling Grade for Canada in Latest Economic
Ranking,
GLOBE
&
MAIL
(Mar.
17,
2011),
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/economy/economy-lab/amiddling-grade-for-canada-in-latest-economic-ranking/article612747/.
72 Mark Perry, Due North: Canada’s Marvelous Mortgage and Banking System,
AM. (Feb. 26, 2010), http://www.american.com/archive/2010/february/duenorth-canadas-marvelous-mortgage-and-banking-system.
73 “In 2008, the World Economic Forum ranked Canada’s banking
system the healthiest in the world. America’s ranked 40th, Britain’s 44th.” Fareed
Zakaria, Worthwhile Canadian Initiative, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 6, 2009),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/02/06/worthwhile-canadianinitiative.html.
68

270

2014

Student Work

3:1

and other industrialized nations.74 First, the Canadian banking system
consists of five major banks out of a mere 82 banks in the entire
country.75 These 82 banks benefit from great diversity across
geographic regions.76 Because of the concentration of banks,
coordination between the banks and regulators is facilitated.77
Substantial discussions regarding best banking practices and
brainstorming on methods to weather downturns are feasible and
likely.78
Second, the Canadian mortgage market has built-in
protections that advance the stability of the banking system.79 For
example, all mortgages in Canada are “Full Recourse” mortgages,
meaning that a borrower remains fully responsible for any mortgage,
even if the home has been foreclosed upon.80 This provides a lesser
incentive for borrowers to walk away from mortgages81 while
ensuring that lending institutions retain the ability to recoup all
mortgage liabilities.82 Additionally, Canadian mortgage insurance is
more widespread than in the U.S.,83 giving Canadian banks a
guarantee of repayment for a significant portion of all mortgages.
Finally, Canadian banks fix interest rates for only five years at a time
for mortgages,84 retain a large portion of originated loans on their
Perry, supra note 72.
Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Fareed Zakaria, Worthwhile Canadian Initiative, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 6,
2009),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/02/06/worthwhilecanadian-initiative.html.
81 Economies not using full recourse mortgages incentivize the borrower
to walk away from his home and his loan when times become tough. Id.
82 Interestingly, home ownership in Canada is 69%, as compared to
homeownership in the U.S. at 67.2%. Perry, supra note 72.
83 Roughly half of all Canadian mortgages carry mortgage insurance; yet,
in the U.S. pre-Great Recession, mortgage insurance was found on only fifteen
percent of all mortgages and typically only on high leveraged mortgages with less
than twenty percent equity. Id.
84 Because rates are fixed for only a short time, every five years an
adjustment to interest rates occurs, allowing the interest rates on mortgages to
adjust with market conditions. Id.
74
75
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own balance sheets,85 and engage in the subprime mortgage market to
a lesser degree than banks in other major economies.86
Additional sources of Canadian economic stability lie in the
Country’s pre-Great Recession regulation of its banks. Canadian
banks have maintained a strong regulatory framework since the
economic crisis in the early 2000s.87 They are regulated on a federal
level by four major regulatory agencies: The Department of
Finance,88 the Bank of Canada,89 the Office of the Superintendent of
Financial Institutions (OSFI),90 and the Canada Deposit Insurance
Corporation.91 Each agency has a specific focus or area of expertise.92
In addition, non-national banks are regulated by agencies at the
provincial level.93 Canada also has several committees that facilitate
collaboration between the regulatory agencies, both federal and
provincial, so that all issues and regulations are addressed between
the sister agencies on both a regional and national scale.94 Most
importantly, however, is the “sunset clause” which causes all federal
financial regulations to lapse every five years, ensuring that each of
the above named agencies review financial legislation periodically for
soundness.95
Canadian banks service sixty-eight percent of the mortgages they
originate; therefore, they have a continued interest in the risk associated with each
loan they write. Id.
86 Id.
87 During that same time period, however, U.S. and E.U. banks were
loosening banking regulations to stimulate economic growth following the
recession of 2001. Zakaria, supra note 80.
88 The Department of Finance is responsible for the overall stability of
the financial system and overarching financial sector legislation. FIN. STABILITY
BOARD,
PEER
REVIEW
OF
CANADA
9
(Jan.
30,
2012),
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_120130.pdf.
89 The Bank of Canada assesses risk and provides liquidity to the
Canadian financial system. Id.
90 OSFI is the regulator and supervisor of federal Canadian financial
institutions. Id.
91 The Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation insures deposits of
financial institutions. Id.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 10.
94 Id. at 10-11.
95 Id. at 11.
85
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To increase stability further, Canadian regulatory agencies
have mandated significant minimum capital requirements since
1999.96 At that time, banks were required to meet or exceed seven
percent Tier 1 capital ratios and ten percent total capital ratios.97
Additionally, OSFI reserved the right to direct a bank to increase its
capital through institution-specific requirements.98 Regulatory
agencies also required Canadian banks to limit leverage to twenty-toone,99 and in 2009, Canadian banks were typically leveraged below
that rate at eighteen-to-one.100
Overall, no one element has led to the strength of the
Canadian economy. Certainly the development of a strong regulatory
framework, the self-protecting practices of the lending market, and
the comparatively high capital requirements101 in the banking sector
had a major impact on the stability of Canadian financial institutions.
Nonetheless, Canada, as a member of the G-20, is taking steps to
make changes following Basel III’s adoption.
The OSFI established a plan to complete its interpretation of
Basel III requirements by the end of 2012 and began implementation
in the first fiscal quarter of 2013.102 In its plan, all deposit-taking
institutions were required to meet the seven percent Tier 1 target.103
Although Canadian deposit institutions were previously required to
meet a seven percent Tier 1 minimum, OSFI recognized that some
institutions may have fallen below the minimum as a result of
pressure from international financial instability.104 OSFI, therefore,

Id. at 12.
Id.; Compare supra Section III.B. and III.C. for a discussion of Basel II
and Basel III capital requirements.
98 FIN. STABILITY BOARD, supra note 88, at 12.
99 Id.
100 Zakaria, supra note 80.
101 See supra Section III. As compared to the overall requirements under
the Basel models.
102 Press Release, Office of the Superintendent of Fin. Insts. Canada,
Basel III Implementation – Capital Adequacy and Liquidity Requirements (Feb. 1,
2011),
http://www.osfibsif.gc.ca/app/DocRepository/1/eng/guidelines/capital/advisories/cptlq_e.pdf.
103 Id.
104 Id.
96
97
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recognized that banks should continue to “maintain prudent earnings
retention policies and avoid actions that weaken their capital
position.”105 Additionally, OSFI acknowledged that its current
leverage ratio calculation did not necessarily conform with the Basel
III rules, but intended not to take steps to alter its own ratios and
monitoring until the Basel III leverage ratio was finalized.106 Finally,
OSFI made no plans to begin implementation of the liquidity
coverage ratio until BCBS deemed such actions necessary.107 Rather,
OSFI planned to work with small banks and foreign bank branches
to determine how the new metrics established under Basel III might
work with their operations.108
In addition to the minimum capital requirements, OSFI
addressed the quality of capital necessary under Basel III. It planned a
mandatory requirement that all non-common share capital
instruments contain a provision in their contract terms that allows for
the conversion to common share capital upon a triggering event.109
Specifically, OSFI established regulations allowing the mandate of a
full and permanent conversion of the class of capital if OSFI
determines that the financial institution’s viability has ceased or the
Canadian government has decided to support the financial institution
for any other reason.110 OSFI also encouraged financial institutions to
confirm the quality of capital with OSFI111 prior to issuing
questionable capital instruments.112 Additionally, financial institutions
Id.
Id.
107 FIN. STABILITY BOARD, supra note 88, at 15.
108 Id.
109 Press Release, Office of the Superintendent of Fin. Insts. Canada,
Non-Viability
Contingent
Capital
(Aug.
2011),
http://www.osfibsif.gc.ca/app/DocRepository/1/eng/guidelines/capital/advisories/nvcc_e.pdf.
110 Id.; see also John Greenwood, Canadian Banks Stronger Than They Look:
OSFI,
FIN.
POST
(May
8,
2013),
http://business.financialpost.com/2013/05/08/osfi-canadian-banks-strongerthan-they-look/.
111 Although such action is encouraged, OSFI has no current intention to
make confirmation of quality of capital mandatory. Press Release, Office of the
Superintendent of Fin. Insts. Canada, Non-Viability Contingent Capital (Aug.
2011),
http://www.osfibsif.gc.ca/app/DocRepository/1/eng/guidelines/capital/advisories/nvcc_e.pdf.
112 Id.
105
106
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are instructed to redeem any capital instruments that do not meet
Basel III standards at their regular redemption dates, rather than
waiting for regulatory events to trigger redemption.113
The BCSB and FSB did not include any Canadian banks on
the SIB list.114 As a result, OSFI and other Canadian regulatory
agencies were not required to establish heightened minimum capital
requirements for its largest financial institutions.115 Overall, because
Canada has no SIBs, already has substantial minimum capital
requirements for financial institutions, and intends to make no
additional changes until Basel III liquidity and leverage ratios are
finalized, Canadian financial institutions will be in substantial
compliance with Basel III goals from its implementation in the first
fiscal quarter of 2013.
B. Switzerland
Switzerland has long been known as one of the safest places
in the world for affluent individuals to store their wealth.116 Prior to
the Great Recession, Swiss banks held assets worth more than six
times the country’s overall gross domestic product (GDP).117 In
comparison, U.S. banks held assets totaling a mere seventy percent of
Press Release, Office of the Superintendent of Fin. Insts. Canada,
Treatment of Non-qualifying Capital Instruments (Feb. 2011), http://www.osfibsif.gc.ca/app/DocRepository/1/eng/guidelines/capital/advisories/nqcibIII_e.pd
f.
114 See supra Part II.C.
115 See supra Part II.C. Although no Canadian banks were included on the
SIB list, the OSFI designated all of Canada’s six largest banks as domestic
systemically important banks. These six banks are subject to a 1% risk-weighted
capital surcharge and subject to continued supervisory intensity and enhanced
disclosure requirements. Stephen B. Kerr, Canadian Banks Come to Grips with Basel
III,
LEXOLOGY
(Oct.
10,
2013),
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=a815f72b-005e-43b0-b3660a52f62cda12.
116 Craig Whitlock, Banking Crisis Has Made Even the Swiss Uneasy, WASH.
POST,
Oct.
15,
2008,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/story/2008/10/15/ST2008101500708.html.
117 Stefan Theil, What the Swiss Did Right, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 27, 2010),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2010/12/27/how-switzerland-savedits-banking-industry.html.
113
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its GDP during the same time period.118 The sheer size of the Swiss
banking sector compared to the Swiss economy substantiates the
importance of financial stability to the country.
Two major banks, UBS and Credit Suisse, dominate the Swiss
banking sector.119 Together, UBS and Credit Suisse held $2.85 trillion
in assets before the Great Recession, totaling more than four times
Switzerland’s GDP at the time.120 UBS and Credit Suisse operate
internationally and focus on investment banking and wealth
management, with half of the wealth management assets coming
from foreign clients.121 The Swiss banking sector is also composed of
cantonal banks122 and other regional banks that operate
domestically.123
In 2008, when the Great Recession began and international
financial institutions began failing, the Swiss government looked to
UBS and Credit Suisse as possible sources of economic instability.124
Because of the size of the two banks, Swiss agencies recognized that
the Swiss economy was simply not large enough to bail out the banks
if they failed125 and feared that collapse in either could throw the
entire country into financial turmoil.126

Id.
FIN. STABILITY BOARD, PEER REVIEW OF SWITZERLAND 9 (Jan. 25,
2011), http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_250112.pdf.
120 In 2011, the assets of UBS and Credit Suisse totaled more than twice
Switzerland’s GDP, a sharp reduction from 2007-2008 dominance. Id.; Whitlock,
supra note 116.
121 FIN. STABILITY BOARD, supra note 119, at 9 n.3.
122 Cantonal banks operate within Switzerland’s individual cantons, or
states, typically servicing only individual cantons and owned either entirely or in the
large majority by the canton. As of early 2013, 24 cantonal banks exist. Cantonal
Banks,
CANTONAL
BANK,
http://www.kantonalbank.ch/e/gruppe/kantonalbanken/index.php (last visited
Jan. 4, 2013).
123 FIN. STABILITY BOARD, supra note 119, at 9.
124 Whitlock, supra note 116.
125 Theil, supra note 117.
126 Whitlock, supra note 116.
118
119
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In the same time period, as a result of aggressive expansion to
its investment banking business, UBS found itself in trouble.127 The
bank quickly secured billions in capital from new share offerings and
injections from international investors and governments,128 but the
effort was insufficient to stabilize the bank.129 As a result, the Swiss
government took additional steps to secure the bank.130 The Swiss
central bank nationalized $54 billion131 of UBS’s assets and
recapitalized the remaining private assets.132 UBS did not fail as a
result of the financial crisis, but public perception of the bank did not
recover from the negativity surrounding its instability.133
Credit Suisse also suffered major losses as a result of the
financial crisis.134 However, unlike UBS, a capital injection from
international investors was sufficient to prevent the need for
government intervention.135
The smaller Swiss banking institutions did not face similar
struggles during the financial crisis.136 Instead, they were able to gain
market share at the expense of UBS’ and Credit Suisse’s questionable

Id.
Id.
129 Theil, supra note 117.
130 Id.
131 Alan Cowell, UBS and Credit Suisse get Urgent Bailout Funds, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct.16,
2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/16/business/worldbusiness/16iht17swiss.17006058.html?_r=0 (last visited Jan. 4, 2013).
132 Theil, supra note 117.
133 See Whitlock, supra note 116.
134 Totaling $19 billion in comparison to UBS’s $53 billion in losses from
2007 until 2009. FIN. STABILITY BOARD, supra note 119, at 11 n.10.
135 Alan Cowell, UBS and Credit Suisse get Urgent Bailout Funds, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct.
16,
2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/16/business/worldbusiness/16iht17swiss.17006058.html?_r=0 (last visited Jan. 4 2013).
136 See FIN. STABILITY BOARD, supra note 119, at 7; SWISS FIN. MKT.
SUPERVISORY AUTH. FINMA, FINANCIAL MARKET CRISIS AND FINANCIAL
MARKET
SUPERVISION
15
(Sept.
14.
2009),
http://www.finma.ch/e/aktuell/Documents/Finanzmarktkrise-undFinanzmarktaufsicht_e.pdf.
127
128
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stability.137 Cantonal banks, in particular, were well capitalized, had
higher quality capital than the two largest banks, and in some cases,
had their liabilities fully guaranteed by their cantons.138 Each of these
factors led to stability during the crisis.
Three agencies regulate the Swiss financial market.139 The
Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA) is the
supervisory and regulatory authority responsible for the financial
industry.140 It was created in 2007 but did not receive full power until
2009.141 FINMA works in conjunction with the Swiss National Bank
(SNB), the nation’s central bank in charge of monetary policy,142 and
the Federal Department of Finance (FDF), the nation’s ministry of
finance in charge of policy.143
As a result of the 2008 financial crisis, Swiss regulatory
agencies moved quickly to ensure the stability of its two largest banks
and to begin tightening banking regulations concerning capital
minimums and adequacy.144 During this time, FINMA mandated
quarterly “stress-testing” to determine risk within each institution.145
FINMA, working with SNB, also set new capital standards for the
two major banks, requiring each institution to hold ten percent Tier 1
Common Equity capital by 2018.146 Additionally, UBS and Credit

FIN. STABILITY BOARD, supra note 119, at 7; SWISS FIN. MKT.
SUPERVISORY AUTH. FINMA, FINANCIAL MARKET CRISIS AND FINANCIAL
MARKET
SUPERVISION
15
(Sept.
14.
2009),
http://www.finma.ch/e/aktuell/Documents/Finanzmarktkrise-undFinanzmarktaufsicht_e.pdf.
138 FIN. STABILITY BOARD, supra note 119, at 7.
139 See id. at 10.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 FINMA, Memorandum of Understanding in the Field of Financial
Stability Between the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority FINMA and
the
Swiss
National
Bank
SNB
1
(Feb.
23,
2010),
http://www.snb.ch/en/mmr/reference/mofu/source.
143 FIN. STABILITY BOARD, supra note 119, at 10.
144 Id. at 12.
145 Id. at 25
146 Swiss Banks get Stricter Rules than Basel III, SWISS BROADCASTING CORP.,
Oct. 4, 2010,
137
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Suisse will be mandated to increase their current total capital
requirements to nineteen percent after including nine percent
contingent convertible bonds.147 Contingent convertible bonds are
newly developed instruments that would commit their holders to buy
shares from the banks in times of dire financial straits.148 For cantonal
and smaller banks, the Basel III framework’s eight percent minimum
capital requirement is expected to be adopted into Swiss law, with
complete implementation by 2019.149
The Swiss Bankers Association predicted in 2010 that Swiss
authorities would pressure international agencies like the BCBS to
adopt strict standards equal to those the Swiss agencies previously
adopted.150 When the Basel III requirements were subsequently
approved, however, swift acting Swiss agencies were forced to
confront the reality that such extreme differences in regulations could
have a negative impact on the Swiss financial sector.151 UBS and
Credit Suisse’s heightened capital requirements could easily impact
Switzerland’s international competitiveness in an already competitive
market.152
Through the fourth quarter of 2012, UBS struggled greatly to
remain competitive in its investment banking business, experiencing a
$2.3 billion loss in the third quarter of 2012.153 The bank also
announced plans to lay off more than 10,000 workers over a threeyear period.154 Credit Suisse faced similar problems and potential
http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/Specials/Rebuilding_the_financial_sector/News,_re
sults,_regulations/Swiss_banks_get_stricter_rules_than_Basel_III.html?cid=28464
958.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 FIN. STABILITY BOARD, supra note 119, at 14.
150 Matthew Allen, Swiss Banking Regulation Leads the Field, SWISS
BROADCASTING CORP., Oct. 5, 2010,
http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/Specials/Rebuilding_the_financial_sector/News,_re
sults,_regulations/Swiss_banking_regulation_leads_the_field.html?cid=28472592.
151 Tim Devaney, Global Crisis Squeezes Swiss Banks, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 4,
2012,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/nov/4/global-crisissqueezes-swiss-banks-as-regulations-/?page=all.
152 Allen, supra note 150.
153 Devaney, supra note 151.
154 Id.
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restructuring, but with a smaller investment banking business, the
pressure to drop the entire business segment was not as great as that
which UBS faced.155 This deteriorating effect on risky investment
banking may likely have been well within the Swiss regulators’
intentions when it implemented more stringent capital regulations
than those adopted under Basel III.156
In addition to its struggling investment banking business,
UBS stopped paying dividends, hoping that holding onto retained
earnings would help it secure the required minimum capital.157 Credit
Suisse, reporting solid progress towards the new capital minimum
goals, continued to pay dividends to its shareholders.158
Unfortunately, the bank lagged far behind competitors abroad when
using Basel III159 standards to evaluate capital adequacy.160 Although
some approaches to valuation projected Credit Suisse’s 2012 Tier 1
capital above the benchmark required by Swiss law after full
implementation in 2019, financial services firm Barclays applied new
capital adequacy standards to Credit Suisse’s assets and projected just
under six percent adjusted capital.161

Id.; see also David Jolly & Chad Bray, Credit Suisse to Streamline and
Shrink,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Oct
24,
2013,
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/10/24/credit-suisse-profits-rise-but-resultsfall-short-of-expectations/?_r=1.
156 Swiss Banks get Stricter Rules than Basel III, SWISS BROADCASTING CORP.,
Oct. 4, 2010,
http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/Specials/Rebuilding_the_financial_sector/News,_re
sults,_regulations/Swiss_banks_get_stricter_rules_than_Basel_III.html?cid=28464
958.
157 As of June 2012, UBS held seven-and-a-half percent Tier 1 capital
under Basel III’s capital adequacy standards. Julia Werdigier, Switzerland and Britain
Gird
Against
the
Storm,
N.Y.
TIMES,
June
14,
2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/15/business/global/british-plan-offers-morefunds-to-banks.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
158 Id.
159 As opposed to earlier Swiss standards.
160 Peter Eavis, Why European Bank Buffers May Not be Quite What They
Seem, N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/05/07/whyeuropean-bank-buffers-may-not-be-quite-what-they-seem/.
161 Id.
155
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Although Swiss banking is synonymous with safety, the
structure of the industry showed stability issues that may have
remained hidden without the widespread international financial
turmoil of the Great Recession. Switzerland’s quick action was likely
facilitated by its small regulatory system and may have aided the
country in warding off major problems. Yet, such swift action may
reduce industry competitiveness in the future when Swiss banks vie
for business against institutions following Basel III’s requirements. 162
Furthermore, implementation may prove to be a burdensome if not
impractical task.
C. European Union
The European Union’s financial industry saw some of the
earliest turmoil during the Great Recession.163 In fact, as early as
August 2007, Deutsche Bank and other private German lending
institutions were forced to inject $4.8 billion in capital to save the
struggling IKB Deutsche Industriebank.164 Shortly thereafter in
September 2007, the Bank of England provided emergency aid to
Northern Rock.165 Since those initial rescues, and as recently as June
of 2012,166 E.U. member countries chose to rescue major banks
within their financial sector.167 The size and importance of many

See UBS Profits Slide, Risk Assets High Ahead of Stress Tests, IFA
MAGAZINE, Oct. 29. 2013, http://www.ifamagazine.com/news/ubs-profits-sliderisk-assets-high-ahead-of-stress-tests-286230.
163 See Tobias Buck, National Reputation Hangs on IKB Rescue, FIN. TIMES,
Aug. 2, 2007, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7017b0c0-411a-11dc-8f370000779fd2ac.html - axzz2ABEJZjXP.
164 Id
165 EUROPEAN
COMMISSION, HIGH-LEVEL EXPERT GROUP ON
REFORMING THE STRUCTURE OF THE EU BANKING SECTOR 5 (Oct. 2, 2012),
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/highlevel_expert_group/report_en.pdf.
166 Alan Wheatley, Proud, Too-Big-to-Fail Spain Ponder Bank Rescue,
REUTERS, June 7, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/07/us-spaineurope-outlook-idUSBRE85619U20120607.
167 Landon Thomas & Nelson Schwartz, In Euro Zone, Banking Fear Feeds
on
Itself,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Sept.
6,
2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/07/business/global/in-euro-zone-bankingfear-feeds-on-itself.html?hp&_r=0.
162
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European banks means that countries cannot allow banks to fail
without compromising the stability of the E.U.’s entire economy.168
The framework of the European banking sector is
complex.169 Although the E.U. is made up of seventeen independent
banking systems using a singular currency,170 since the adoption of
the Euro, financial integration across member states increased up
until the Great Recession.171 The European banking sector as a whole
is large, even when compared to other major financial
powerhouses.172 Banking sector assets are five times as great in the
E.U. than in the U.S., and make up about 350% of the E.U.’s
GDP.173 The United Kingdom, Germany, and France are home to
the largest banking sectors when measured by total assets. 174
Additionally, the size of individual financial institutions within the
E.U. is great—half of the world’s thirty largest banks when ranked by
total assets are in the E.U.175 Specifically, fifteen of the twenty-nine
SIBs176 are located in E.U. member countries.177 However, the E.U. is
not made up exclusively of large financial institutions, as Europe is
home to more than 8,000 banks with smaller institutions comprising
a quarter of total banking assets in the E.U.178
Stephen Castle, Europe to Approve Guidelines on Bank Failures, N.Y.
TIMES,
Apr.
4,
2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/04/business/worldbusiness/04regs.html.
169 See generally EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 165, at 11-19.
170 Angelo Young, Danger from European Banks’ Too-Big-To-Fail Syndrome
Keeps Growing: Report, INTERNATIONAL BUS. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2012),
http://www.ibtimes.com/danger-european-banks-too-big-fail-syndrome-keepsgrowing-report-790102.
171 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 165, at 11, 30.
172 Id. at 13.
173 Id. at 11-12.
174 Id. at 12-13.
175 France, Sweden, and the United Kingdom each have banking markets
dominated by large domestic banks, while countries such as Austria, Germany, and
Spain, have more, smaller banks. Id. at 18.
176 See supra Part II.C.
177 Agustino Fontevecchia, The 29 Global Banks That Are Too Big to Fail,
FORBES,
Nov.
4,
2011,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/afontevecchia/2011/11/04/the-worlds-29-mostsystemically-important-banks/; EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 165, at 38.
178 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 165, at 34-35.
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The integration of the E.U. financial network across member
countries increases need for a stable banking industry because failure
in any of the major banks within a single member country raises the
likelihood of economic crisis affecting multiple member countries.179
As a result of such overlap and potential repercussions of bank
failures, E.U. governments recognized the compelling need to inject
funding into the private sector, even though such action violates
traditional E.U. policy.180 In addition, in 2010, the E.U. chose to
create the European Banking Authority (EBA).181 The E.U. had a
predecessor advisory group,182 but the EBA is the first body with the
power to create a singular E.U. rulebook that will be binding on all
E.U. banks.183 In December of 2012, the E.U. also agreed to expand
the European Central Bank’s (ECB) supervisory power to include
direct supervision of the largest 100 to 200 banks in the E.U.184
Previously, banks were overseen primarily by national regulators.185
Under the agreement, smaller banking institutions would remain
subject to their current regulators.186 The aim of ECB in its improved

Stephen Castle, Europe to Approve Guidelines on Bank Failures, N.Y.
TIMES,
Apr.
4,
2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/04/business/worldbusiness/04regs.html.
180 Buck, supra note 163.
181 Council Regulation 1093/2010, 2010 O.J. (L331), 12-47 http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:331:0012:01:EN:HTML.
182 About
us, COMM. OF EUROPEAN BANKING SUPERVISORS,
http://www.eba.europa.eu/Aboutus.aspx.
183 Matthew Elderfield, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Ireland
and Alternative Chairman of the European Banking Authority, Address to the 4th
CDU/CSU Congress in the Bundestag: European Banking Regulation and the
Eurozone Crisis (Mar. 26, 2012), http://www.bis.org/review/r120327f.pdf.
184 James Kanter, European Leaders Hail Accord on Banking Supervision, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 13, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/14/business/global/euleaders-hail-accord-on-banking-supervision.html?_r=0.
185 Such a set up proved ineffective when dealing with a financial sector
that has become integrated across national borders. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra
note 165, at 107.
186 Under the agreement, the ECB at its discretion could step in and take
over supervisions of any bank in the E.U., if deemed necessary. Kanter, supra note
184.
179
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state is to create uniformity and reduce the domestic political
influences that permeated the national banking regulation scheme.187
Leading up to the Great Recession and in response to the
Basel I and II frameworks, the E.U. passed two directives designed to
implement minimum capital requirements.188 These directives were
known as Capital Requirements Directives (CRD) I and II, and were
packages of non-binding legislation designed to implement the
various aspects of Basel I and II.189 Each directive established a
minimum and total common equity requirement of two percent,190
and each required no countercyclical buffer and no capital
conservation buffer, but permitted banks to use their own internal
risk models to calculate risk weights.191 Additionally, because CRD I
and CRD II were directives, they were not binding.192 Rather, they
were merely legislative acts that set out goals for each EU state to
achieve, and member states were permitted to diverge significantly in
their own individual implementations.193 In fact, some member states
chose a transitional opt-out of the standards.194 Moreover, leverage
ratios in European banks often exceed thirty-to-one, and in some
cases, are as great as fifty-to-one.195

187 Peter Gumble, Too European To Fail? New E.U. Banking Safety Net Takes
Shape, TIME, Dec. 17, 2012, http://business.time.com/2012/12/17/too-europeanto-fail-new-eu-banking-safety-net-takes-shape/.
188 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 165, at 68-69.
189 Capital
Requirements Directive: Repealed Legislation, EUROPEAN
COMMISSION,
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/regcapital/repealedlegislation_en.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2014).
190 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 165, at 11.
191 Id. at 69.
192 See,
Regulations, Directives and other acts, EUROPEAN UNION,
http://europa.eu/eu-law/decision-making/legal-acts/index_en.htm (last visited
Jan. 31, 2014), for a brief overview of European law.
193 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 165, at 71.
194 CRD II was passed after the transitional opt-out for CRD I, but still,
several member states did not meet the implementation requirements CRD II. Id.
195 Colin Barr, Europe: The New Wall Street?, CNN.COM (Oct. 7, 2008),
http://money.cnn.com/2008/10/06/news/europe.leverage.fortune/index.htm.
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Under the E.U. legislation implementing Basel III, CRD IV,
the capital requirements generally follow those outlined by BIS.196
Total capital requirements under the legislation are eight percent, a
total of four-and-a-half percent of which must be common Tier 1
capital.197 The E.U. differs from Basel III requirements in that the
percentage of Tier 1 capital must be gradually increased until it
reaches six percent by 2019.198 The legislation also permits member
states, in coordination with the E.U., to require higher levels than
those established under CRD IV.199 Unlike previous regulations,
however, the E.U. will enforce the law as a mandatory regulation,
rather than a directive, to reduce the ability of national regulators to
diverge or reduce the weight of the proposal.200 Although the
percentages of capital remain consistent with the aims of Basel III,
the E.U. legislation does diverge on certain details.201 Specifically, the
E.U. counts as Tier 1 capital lesser types of capital202 than those
supplied under Basel III and places a maximum on the capital ratio
that member states may impose on their banks.203
Even though the E.U. took steps to increase the stability of
its financial sector by increasing union-wide banking regulations for
the first time since the formation of the E.U., it failed to meet a
major benchmark in Basel III implementation.204 The E.U.’s new
minimum capital rules would complement the creation of the
banking-union and create a measure for the ECB to enforce through
196 Compare BASEL III, supra note 4, at 2, with EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
supra note 165, at 69.
197 Commission Regulation 575/2013, art. 92, 2013 O.J. (L176) 64;
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 165, at 69.
198 Commission Regulation 575/2013, art. 92, 2013 O.J. (L176) 64.
199 See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 165 at 70.
200 Geoffrey Smith, EU’s Proposal to Implement Basel III Undermines Spirit,
WALL
ST.
JOURNAL,
July
28,
2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904800304576472393933772876
.html; see Commission Regulation 575/2013, 2013 O.J. (L176) 1.
201 Id.
202 Such as deferred tax assets and minority interests. Id.
203 Id.
204 See Europe ‘to Push for Basel III Delay as it Lobbies U.S.,’ TELEGRAPH
(Nov.
12,
2012
6:11AM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/9704822/Eu
rope-to-push-for-Basel-III-delay-as-it-lobbies-US.html.
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its new supervisory powers.205 However, the E.U. failed to pass Basel
III regulation by the January 1, 2013 deadline established by BIS. 206
Although the E.U. legislature recognized the need for stronger
regulation of the banking industry, given the systemic importance of
the many E.U. banks, passing new minimum capital measures before
other competitive nations (such as the U.S.) could have compromised
the recovery of the E.U. financial sector and may have been the
major cause for the delay.207 The regulation was adopted on June 27,
2013 with implementation set to commence on January 1, 2014 and
full implementation to be reached by 2019.208
IV. IS UNIFORMITY POSSIBLE?
Enacting capital requirements for financial institutions across
industrialized nations seems to be the most basic step in preventing
the recurrence of financial turmoil similar to that of the Great
Recession. Establishing minimum capital levels for banks, with
increased requirements for large, systemically important institutions,
may help institutions weather the storm of financial strife so that
banks do not go bankrupt or suffer bank runs.209
Several major problems exist with Basel III. Because Basel III
is a recommendation of best practices, introduced with no legal
Id.
Id.; The U.S. and fifteen other members of the Basel Committee also
failed to meet the deadline. Lianna Brinded, Basel III: Less Than Half of Nations Meet
Deadline for New Bank Capital Rules, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2012),
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/articles/420179/20130103/basel-iii-capitalrequirements-committee-regulation.htm.
207 Europe ‘to Push for Basel III Delay as it Lobbies U.S.,’ TELEGRAPH, Nov.
12,
2012,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/9704822/Eu
rope-to-push-for-Basel-III-delay-as-it-lobbies-US.html; see also Eric Vidal, EU’s
Barnier Says U.S. Should Respect Basel III, REUTERS, Jan. 31, 2013,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/31/us-eu-banksidUSBRE90U0D520130131.
208 See Implementing Basel III Europe: CRD IV Package, EUROPEAN
BANKING AUTH., http://www.eba.europa.eu/regulation-and-policy/implementingbasel-iii-europe (last visited Dec. 28, 2013).
209 See supra Part II.C.
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206
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authority from BCBS, countries may modify the terms or fail to
implement the measures altogether. The E.U.’s passage of directives
concerning Basel I and II and national failures to adopt such
measures are a stark example of the ineffectiveness of
recommendations lacking legal authority.210 As mentioned above,
after the directive implementing Basel I and II, some E.U. member
states failed to follow through with their own regulations by taking
advantage of a transitional opt-out period. Still many E.U. member
states failed to ever follow through with implementation of the new
regulations.
Basel III implementation may face difficulties similar to Basel
I and II in the E.U. The initial deadline for Basel III implementation
to begin was January 1, 2013. Sixteen members of the G-20 did not
meet that benchmark.211 However, one year later, the majority of the
G-20 took steps to implement some form of Basel III regulation,
with most becoming effective on January 1, 2014.212
Of those member nations that chose to follow through with
implementing Basel III regulations, the risk remains that the intent of
Basel III will be diluted by changes at the national level. Switzerland
has stepped up the recommendations of Basel III.213 However, by
acting ahead of the final Basel III recommendations, Swiss banks
may face a disadvantage in competitiveness.214 Nations slow to follow
through with implementation may recognize the Swiss setback and
set standards below those recommended under Basel III to protect
the competitiveness and recovery of their own banking institutions.
Further, the E.U., although adopting the minimum ratios, intends to
The E.U. proposal for Basel III implementation will likely take the
form of a mandatory regulation to correct the problem of previous iterations. See
supra pp. 22-23.
211 Brinded, supra note 206.
212 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Progress Report on
Implementation of the Basel Regulatory Framework 4-13 (2013),
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs263.pdf.
213 See supra pp. 17-18.
214 Matthew Allen, Swiss Banking Regulation Leads the Field, SWISS
BROADCASTING CORP., Oct. 5, 2010,
http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/Specials/Rebuilding_the_financial_sector/News,_re
sults,_regulations/Swiss_banking_regulation_leads_the_field.html?cid=28472592.
210
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diverge from Basel III’s capital adequacy standards.215 The E.U. will
accept lesser forms of capital than those suggested by Basel III as
Tier 1, diluting the effectiveness of the minimum Tier 1 capital ratio
established by the BCBS.216
Finally, the minimum recommendation may be deceiving as a
baseline measure because it may ultimately function as a maximum
requirement. Switzerland recognized the need for greater
requirements than those suggested by Basel III in order to protect its
massive institutions and the media responded with concerns
regarding competitiveness.217 Conversely, it is speculated that the
E.U.’s delay in passing a final measure concerned the feared lack of
competitiveness with the U.S. market due to the U.S.’s failure to meet
the same deadline.218 Thus, many nations may look to the actions of
their peers and focus on competitiveness rather than stability,
choosing not to enforce minimums above those established under
Basel III even if such a choice is made at the expense of their
financial sector’s stability.
The Canadian financial sector is a great example of the
positive effects of maintaining certain levels of capital has on the
stability of a financial industry. As discussed in Part IV.A, Canadian
regulations leading up to the Great Recession required Tier 1 and
overall capital ratios just above those established by Basel III. In
effect, the Canadian banking sector experienced no bank failures and
managed to thrive while the international economy floundered. 219
Alternatively, the E.U. member states stand as a prime example that
bank failures or necessary rescues may occur when capital minimums

See supra pp. 22-23.
Additionally, the E.U. proposal of a maximum capital ratio is
troubling in light of the stabilizing aims of Basel III because banks should not be
discouraged from favoring stability over competitiveness in a systemically
important industry. See supra pp. 22-23.
217 Allen, supra note 214.
218 Europe ‘to Push for Basel III Delay as it Lobbies U.S.,’ TELEGRAPH (Nov.
12,
2012),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/9704822/Eu
rope-to-push-for-Basel-III-delay-as-it-lobbies-US.html; see also supra, Part III.C.
219 See supra p. 9, notes 72-74.
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and liquidity are insufficient to weather downturns in related financial
markets and economies.220
Conversely, although Swiss regulators have traditionally gone
above and beyond recommended standards, including those under
Basel I,221 Swiss banking institutions struggled to maintain stability
during the Great Recession.222 In Switzerland, it was not the lack of
capital alone that worried regulators. Rather, the sheer size of Swiss
major banking institutions and the perceived inability of the
government to bail out the institutions if they failed caused concern.
It took a combination of international investors, nationalization of
assets, and recapitalization of private assets to secure the fates of the
largest institutions, even with minimum capital safeguards.223
Establishing minimum capital requirements may be a step
towards stabilizing banking sectors,224 but those measures alone, as
evidenced by Switzerland’s struggles, are insufficient to offer broad
protection to the banking industry. From an analysis and comparison
of the Canadian, Swiss, and E.U. financial industries, certain other
factors appear to be necessary for long-term stability.
Using Canada as a blueprint, it appears that emphasis on a
strong regulatory framework, control of the size of institutions, and
strong coordination between institutions and regulators is necessary
for resiliency in the banking industry.225 Both Switzerland and the
See supra pp.19-20.
Press Release, Swiss Federal Banking Commission, Implementation of
Basel
II
in
Switzerland
(Apr.
2004),
http://www.finma.ch/archiv/ebk/e/archiv/2004/20040429/Referat_Z_E.pdf.
222 See supra Part III.B. (discussing the Swiss banking crisis in 2008).
223 See supra Part III.B.
224 The author recognizes that capital adequacy and minimums are not
the sole focus of Basel III, however, points out that the “five-fold approach” of
Basel III (raising the quality, consistency, and transparency of the capital base;
enhancing risk coverage; supplementing the risk-based capital requirement with a
leverage ratio; promoting countercyclical buffers and capital conservation buffers;
and addressing systemic risk and interconnectedness) focuses on these measures as
the saving grace of the regulation.
225 No doubt, the use of “sunset clauses,” strict lending laws favoring
creditors, and diversified financial institutions contribute to the strength of the
industry. See discussion supra Part III.A.
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E.U. seem to have recognized the importance of strong financial
regulatory bodies, with each creating a new regulatory agency in the
wake of the Great Recession.226
Further, the Great Recession has brought about financial
institutions larger than those pre-Recession due to buyouts and
mergers.227 Because half of the world’s SIBs lie in Europe, the
stability of the region’s financial sector may be increased by the
reduction of such systemically important institutions.228 Basel III
acknowledges the necessity of regulating SIBs;229 however, if the E.U.
fails to take major steps towards regulation and size limitation, the
presence of so many major institutions could prove destructive to its
long-term financial stability.230 Switzerland has already taken major
steps to protect its two largest institutions, but long-term monitoring
will likely be necessary for its continued stability.231
One final element to long-term stability may rest less on the
regulations placed on the financial industry and more on the actions
and goals of the industry itself. Canadian banks, for instance, seem to
focus on the good of its economy and the long-term viability and
success of its financial industry as the primary goals. Competitiveness
in, and dominance of, the international financial sector appear not to
be major focuses of business in Canada.232 In contrast, Switzerland
and the E.U. both have concerns about international competitiveness
as a result of new minimum capital and liquidity requirements,
appearing to deemphasize the resiliency and long-term viability of
their banking sectors. Although the Canadian difference may be a
cultural one, it should be a role model for other nations struggling to
keep their banking industries and economies afloat.
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See supra Parts III.B., III.C.
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See supra pp. 20-21.
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CONCLUSION
As international economies began to suffer financial distress
as a result of the Great Recession, the Bank for International
Settlements and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
gathered with leaders of the G-20 to modify international banking
standards to secure the stability of financial institutions. With the
agreement known as Basel III, the Basel Committee recommended
that members of the G-20 agree on national regulations with
increased minimum capital and liquidity requirements for banks
within their countries to help prevent future banking failures and the
resultant impact such failures have on individual economies.
Although some nations, such as Canada and Switzerland met the
January 1, 2013 deadline, others, such as the E.U. and U.S. failed to
do so.
Basel III, in its most basic form, appears to be a strong
solution and response to the financial crisis of 2007 and 2008. Upon
examination of divergent economies and a study of pre-Recession
banking regulation, it becomes clear that standards which focus on
capital and liquidity alone are not sufficient to prevent struggles in the
banking sector. The measure, although agreed upon by members of
the G-20, is plagued with difficulties that will limit its effectiveness.
The ability of nations to dilute the recommendations or fail to
implement the regulations altogether will likely have a detrimental
effect on the sufficiency of Basel III. Additionally, earlier iterations
have failed to prevent financial crises, and it is unlikely the third
iteration will be any different without substantial changes to national
financial regulation as a whole. Although any strengthening of the
financial industry may provide some benefit to national economies,
Basel III is unlikely to provide significant protections from future
crises if economies face instability on par with that of the Great
Recession.
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